



THEOLOGY UPDATE

VOEGELIN FOR THE THEOLOGIAN

By Ted Peters*

Eric Voegelin is a sleeper. When I was a teenager in the "Motor City" of Michigan, Detroit, we knew what a sleeper was. It was an unassuming '57 Chevy Bel Aire with a few dents and rust spots in the fenders. But under the hood hummed an engine of about 480 cubic inches, bored and stroked, with a compression ratio of maybe eleven to one, requiring gasoline of a hundred octane or more, and with a transmission we called "four on the floor." The dream scenario of teenage mythology was to chug up to a traffic light next to a Corvette or T-Bird. The drivers would make their respective engines growl a bit and, then, at the flash of green, both would peel out. The sleeper would suddenly awaken, burning rubber all the way to the shift into second gear. Then, so the living myth goes, its finned tail lights would disappear in a cloud of tire smoke over the horizon.

I am wondering if the political philosophy of Eric Voegelin might be such a sleeper. Voegelin is dead now. He died January 19, 1985, while in retirement from the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, where he finished his long and distinguished career

as a scholar and professor. In 1987, posthumously, his final work was published, *In Search of Order*.¹ In the couple of years just preceding his death, there seemed to be a flurry of activity regarding his work. Numerous conferences were held, usually putting Voegelin back to back with hermeneutical philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer or with a disciple or two of theologian Bernard Lonergan. In 1984 he was asked to give a major address before the seventy-fifth anniversary meeting of the American Academy of Religion.²

Voegelin was amazingly prolific. Plans are now being made by Louisiana State University Press to publish his collected works in thirty volumes. The first of these, titled "Autobiographical Reflections," has been scheduled to come off the press in 1989. In the very near future we expect companion volumes to be published by Paul Carinella and Ellis Sandoz. Much will be happening. Will there be any impact on the theological community? Should there be?

Though widely ignored by theologians until just recently, Eric Voegelin may have much to say to us. If we lift the blanket of his political and philosophical language, what we find lying beneath is a profound proto-theological commitment. Raised a Lutheran, Voegelin thought of himself as a pre-Chalcedonian Christian whose primary commitment was to philosophical truth, a truth manifest in Jesus Christ. Though the philosopher is now dead, the question for this installment of Theology Update is whether we should resurrect the philosophy. I suggest the sleeper analogy here because Voegelin's massive work combines the depth and breadth which attracts theologians, so we should ask if we might someday find his philosophy in a theological drag race, perhaps neck and neck with Heidegger, Whitehead, and Ricoeur.

I would summarize Voegelin's philosophy with the following systematic principle: *There is a radical difference between God's order and the human way of ordering things, and, if we confuse the two, we put the world in mortal danger.* Voegelin arrives at this principle through an analysis of the history of the world's civilizations. I would summarize his interpretation of history in terms of three stages. At the most primitive stage, before we humans had gained our soul, we were unable to differentiate between things divine and things human. We conceived of everything on the same plane of reality. Then, at the second stage, a series of revelations occurred, and the distinction between God and the world entered human consciousness in a sharp and unmistakable way. The human race took a "leap in being." Still

Voegelin, is provide us with a spaceless and timeless world of meaning which gives sense and order to the inner soul. Over against Husserl's notion of the transcendental ego which constitutes our consciousness, Voegelin held that the ego is a phenomenon *within* consciousness. In his 1943 essay "On the Theory of Consciousness," he wrote: "The 'I' seems to me to be no given at all but rather a highly complex symbol for certain perspectives in consciousness."⁶ This leads to a series of observations which continued to be significant for Voegelin's philosophy: (1) there is no starting point for consciousness, i.e., we always awake to find ourselves already in the middle of an ongoing process; (2) we participate in consciousness from the inside, i.e., we can never make it an object over against itself; (3) philosophy consists in clarifying one's own pre-reflective experience, i.e., it is essentially meditation. In sum, philosophy is not anchored in speculation but rather in critical reflection upon one's own internal experience.

Yet, noting that consciousness constitutes the ego and not the other way around, we see that this is not a strictly individualist or subjectivist approach. Consciousness is shared. It has a history. This observation takes us from the early to the middle period.

Early Middle Period (1945-1953):
The New Science of Politics

What we are calling Voegelin's "middle period" is characterized by his study of human consciousness through examining its symbolizations in history. Consciousness has a history. There is no timeless or universal structure which is always and everywhere the same. What is of dramatic importance here is his assertion that there have been identifiable events of revelation which have altered and reformed human consciousness. Voegelin went so far as to look back into the history of our civilization to find a point prior to which we humans did not have a soul. He then marked the point at which soul developed. We began to have a soul during the era of the axial breakthrough, he said, following Jaspers, during the era of the Hebrew prophets and the rise of Greek philosophy. He also made the audacious claim that the Christian revelation is an event in empirical history which marks a new era in human understanding and, further, that it constitutes the kind of experience upon which the philosopher needs to reflect.

Voegelin's national reputation as a scholar of note

begins with his delivery of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago in 1951, which were subsequently published as *The New Science of Politics* in 1952. What he referred to as a "new science" is in fact a return to the old science of the ancient Greeks. To approach politics from the perspective of the modern social sciences, he argued, represents a dangerous "deformation" because it is strictly immanentist, i.e., it assumes that the only reality with which we have to deal is the mundane social reality without any reference to the transcendent. It is no wonder, then, that we sit stupefied in the face of the mass destruction wrought by ideologies such as Marxism and Nazism. What we need to do is to retrieve those formative experiences as symbolized by Plato and Aristotle which are based upon a transcendent vision of political order. *The New Science of Politics*, in sum, seeks to perform two tasks: to criticize the deformation of modern social science and to recover the classical symbolism of human political life.

Significant methodologically is Voegelin's contention that Plato and Aristotle had experiences of political order which came from a transcendent source—that these experiences were revelatory in nature—and, further, that what we read in Greek philosophy represents a symbolic expression of revelation and, still further, that our study today of these ancient symbolizations constitutes the empirical science of politics. What Voegelin was pursuing is not the history of ideas per se, but rather, through critical analysis of the ideas, he was pursuing the history of experiences which came to ideational expression.⁷

This becomes important theologically. Voegelin can speak of the Christian revelation as a historical breakthrough. It took us beyond where the Greeks had left us. Take Aristotle, for example. Aristotle had shown us how political friendship, *philia politike*, could be established on the basis of equality. All are equal because all have rational souls. But Aristotle could not found a social bond between unequals. This meant for Aristotle that there could be no friendship, no sharing of political order between humans and God, because our rational minds are not equal to that of God. We humans may pursue such *philia* with God through mystical discipline, but it is bound to sound like a tragic call that goes unanswered. The breakthrough of the Christian experience with God is "the bending of God in grace toward the soul," which makes communion between the divine and the human possible.⁸ Now God and we, though unequals, may share the friendship Thomas Aquinas

of this reality is always present to us, but the story of human consciousness is the story of being coming to symbolic articulation in increasingly differentiated forms.

2. *Compact consciousness* is the most basic form of the human experience of order. Its primary form of symbolization is the cosmogonological myth which puts everything—gods, nature, and humanity—on the same plane of intracosmic existence. All reality which will ever be experienced is already present to compact consciousness, but what is at first vague or indistinct will, under certain conditions, become illuminated and hence differentiated.

3. *Differentiated consciousness* is the result of certain “leaps in being” or “revelations” which bring to articulation the distinction between immanent and transcendent reality. In *Order and History*, which traces the history of order, Voegelin identifies three such leaps in being: prophetic revelation in Ancient Israel, the rise of Greek philosophy, and the Christian experience. What happened in Israel and in Greece complement one another. In each case the cosmological symbolism of the myth was seen as inadequate for expressing the transcendence of the divine beyond intraworldly continuities. In each case our understanding of the divinity of God and the humanity of the human grew together.

The first volume of *Order and History* is called *Israel and Revelation*. In it Voegelin contrasts the cosmological order of the ancient Mesopotamians and Egyptians with the historical order of Israel. The cosmological vision saw divine being flowing into society through periodic regeneration in annual cycles. Beginning with the Exodus, however, Israel began to see its relation to God in terms of a history of revelatory events with human responses. The Israelites gained a heightened awareness of the gulf that separates human community from transcendent divinity which lies beyond the cosmos. With the prophets, especially Jeremiah, the compactness of community experience is broken and the individual human personality becomes the point of spiritual breakthrough and differentiation of consciousness. What originates here, says Voegelin, is the insight that God’s revelation cannot be tied to the laws or customs or religion or book of any particular ethnic community. There is an ecumenic universality implicit here. This makes the task of the suffering servant in Isaiah 53 clear: “From the center of reception in Israel, the news of Redemption must be spread over the whole earth.”¹²

Next comes Voegelin’s retrieval of the leap in being which occurred in ancient Greece. Over

against Protagoras, for whom “man is the measure,” Voegelin makes his basic point by siding with Plato, for whom “God is the measure.”¹³ In Volume II, *The World of the Polis*, he traces the development of the human soul from Homer through Hesiod and the tragedians to the pre-Socratic philosophers. The Homeric myths still lacked a concept of radical transcendence, of God beyond the cosmos. They lacked as well the corresponding understanding of the human soul, of the *psyché*, as the conscious sensorium of transcendence. But this differentiated insight developed as the Greeks moved away from myth and toward philosophy.

This development climaxes in the work of Plato, the brilliant analysis of which dominates Volume III, *Plato and Aristotle*. According to Plato’s *Republic*, the right order for the individual soul as well as human society is “...an embodiment in historical reality of the idea of the Good, of the Agathon.”¹⁴ The embodiment must be taken by the person who has seen the Agathon and let the soul be ordered through the vision, the philosopher. The philosopher, according to the allegory of the cave, is the one who has ascended to the realm of truth and then returned to the realm of darkness, bearing a vision of the good. Hence, with Plato, we get the doctrine that society should be ruled by philosopher-kings. Note what is being emphasized here: We want our rulers to be philosophers, not because they show practical wisdom in managing human affairs, but because they operate from a transcendent vision.

Voegelin makes the same point with respect to Plato’s *Gorgias* and the image of the last judgment. Here the truly just person prefers death to living a life of injustice. It is even better to suffer injustice than to participate in its commission, because to die with an unjust soul is the worst of all evils. True order, both individual and communal, is judged from the “beyond.” If we, dedicated to the true justice, the divine *diké*, take death up into our life, then we join the order of the “reborn.” To be reborn is to have revealed within our soul the true relationship between God and humanity. Because of this experience reported in Plato, Voegelin can conclude: “The revelation of divinity in history is ontologically real.”¹⁵

Voegelin saw Aristotle as a sort of regression from Plato. Aristotle spent too much time analyzing the imperfections in society and dealing with them prudentially, thereby inadvertently setting us on the track toward immanentizing the transcendent. By emphasizing prudential wisdom in the praxis of politics, according to Voegelin, Aristotle imputes an essential

can do. Ideology leads to tyranny and tyranny to murder. The immanentizing of eschatological transcendence cannot help but eventually turn human life into cannon fodder. So Voegelin was grateful to Christianity for giving us the eschatological insight, but his gratitude was qualified. "I am inclined to recognize in the epiphany of Christ," he writes, "the great catalyst that made eschatological consciousness an historical force, both in forming and deforming humanity."²²

When we get to the final volume of *Order and History*, which was edited and published after its author died, one wonders if Voegelin maintained his belief that the Christian insight marks an advance over Plato. Titled *In Search of Order*, it searches for the Beyond in the Beginning through an examination of Genesis chapter one plus a reexamination of Plato's *Timaeus*. At at least one point Plato is superior, he says, because "his formulations are analytically more successful than the later attempts of the Christian theologians to find the *intellectus* of their *fides*."²³ Still, despite Plato's superiority, the Christian experience gets good marks in many of Voegelin's last writings. Asking again and again Plato's question (*Laws* 713a) "Who is this God?," Voegelin notes that the Christian writers know who their God is: He is the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and the prophets.²⁴ The Christian question is rather this: "Who is this Son of God, this Christ, who is the living word of divine truth?" What the Christians had seen with the help of the pneumatic intrusion was the presence of God in this person, in the man Jesus.

Now, the pneumatic experience of the Christian may augment the noetic search of Plato, but it does not replace it. For Plato the noetic quest focuses on the immortalizing movement of the soul toward the Beyond, i.e., the cosmic whole and its permeation of the divine Beyond within the whole. The pneumatic vision of the Christian, in complementary contrast, focuses on the eschatological experience, i.e., the act of grace whereby the divine immortality participates in human mortality. Both are important.

Though his own personal *zetema* kept him working up to the day before he died, like the rest of us, philosopher Voegelin also turned out to be mortal.²⁵ On his deathbed he requested that the Psalms be read to him. When he was listening to the words of Psalm 25 with its message, "O keep my soul and deliver me," he expired. For us still living today, Eric Voegelin is now a philosopher of the past. Yet Eugene Webb, delivering the eulogy at the Stanford University Memorial Chapel on February 4, 1985, reminded

us of an important hermeneutical principle: The voice of the past can still speak to us. This is essential to Voegelin's retrieval of the great insights of the past. Perhaps the past voice of Voegelin himself can speak to us still.

What Kind of a Theologian Was Voegelin?²⁶

In his famous essay, "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," Paul Tillich helped us to distinguish two distinct approaches to the knowledge of God: the Platonic-Augustinian tradition and the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.²⁷ The first is the *ontological* approach which, as Augustine stressed, begins with the immediacy of the knowledge of God within the human soul prior to the split between subject and object in cognition. The second is the *cosmological* approach, such as we find in Thomas Aquinas, where we begin with observations regarding the world and then argue for the existence of God. According to the ontological method, we know God immediately. According to the cosmological method, our knowledge of God is mediated by knowledge of the world. If Tillich's typology is acceptable, then clearly Eric Voegelin falls into the ontological type in the tradition of Plato and Augustine.

This distinction will help us to locate Voegelin's work vis-à-vis a contemporary theologian, neo-Thomist Bernard Lonergan. One would at first think that these two thinkers have much in common because both seek transcendent truth through a theory of human consciousness. Yet there are points at which Lonergan's emphasis on intentionality tends to make God an object of thought.²⁸ God may be an unknown object or a mystery, to be sure, but he is still an intended object. For Voegelin, on the other hand, this is not possible. Rather, Voegelin begins with the mysterious presence of the divine which forms the human soul from within. Hence, for Voegelin, we do not pursue knowledge of God through cognitional acts but rather through a meditative process by which we seek to retrieve our most primitive experiences wherein the transcendent was present and formative. Through attending to our own consciousness we seek the ground of our own existence. The upshot of all this is that Voegelin's refusal to make God an object of thought is so thorough that he may be the most radical representative of the ontological approach that we have.

The task of theology for Plato, then, is to pursue truth. When we turn to confessionally Christian theology, in Voegelin's view, we find a constriction because it limits itself to explicating the *depositum fidei* of scripture. If compelled to choose between the two, Voegelin will choose to be a classical or philosophical theologian.

What, we may ask, would an incorporation of Voegelin's insights do to confessional theology? Should we abandon confessionalism in favor of pursuing truth? Or, perhaps we could propose a complementary compromise. If we were to assign the job of pursuing truth to philosophical theology and give confessional theology a different assignment, then perhaps the two could work together. Let us explore this for a moment. The key would be this: forbid confessional theology from making truth-claims. This suggestion is more than hypothetical. It may already be going on in some contemporary circles where a rule-theory of doctrine is emerging.

One can only ask if this is what Carl Braaten presupposes when describing the confessional principle in theology. He writes, "The chief point of the church's creeds and confessions is not to guarantee 'true doctrine' but rather to set norms for the right preaching of the gospel." He identifies the gospel with the doctrinal norm and then says, "The gospel is summarized in terms of justification by grace alone, through faith alone, on account of Christ alone."³⁶ As Braaten explicates this, it is clear that his objective is to repeat the central teaching of scripture (the *depositum fidei*) in such a way as to identify with the whole of the catholic tradition. In the context of the confessional principle, the truth question is set aside. Yet one can only ask: On the basis of what Braaten has said, does a Christian confessional statement function as a doctrinal proposition asserting the final truth about the ultimate nature of reality, or is it only a normative rule for pursuing gospel identity in theology? Is Braaten a closet relativist who, in order to establish Lutheran identity, has given up on the truth question?³⁷

Though we need to ask Braaten what is going on, we do not need to quiz George Lindbeck. He comes all the way out of the closet. He declares himself to be a theologian who is willing to go out of the truth-claim business entirely and treat confessional commitments strictly as attempts to maintain group identity. He offers us an overt "rule theory," according to which

doctrines qua doctrines are not first-order propositions, but are to be construed as second-order ones: they make...intrasystematic rather than ontological truth claims....Faithful-

ness to such doctrines does not necessarily mean repeating them; rather, it requires, in the making of any new formulations, adherence to the same directives that were involved in their first formulation. It is thus...that faithfulness to an ancient creed such as the Nicene should be construed.³⁸

From this it would appear that Lindbeck and Voegelin could cooperate. Voegelin could pursue philosophical truth in the metaxy, while Lindbeck could shore up the doctrinal coherence of various religious traditions. Hence, Voegelin's criticism of Christian dogmatism would not apply to rule-theory confessionalism, because Lindbeck's doctrines make no claims about reality.

Perhaps, then, we have found a theological method which would be philosophically sound: construe confessional or doctrinal statements as rules for establishing Christian identity and not as propositions regarding the truth about reality. But I am suspicious. I note that Lindbeck is a relativist, whereas Voegelin is not. Voegelin does not accept the current penchant for pluralism. He is by no means an absolutist, however. Voegelin's point is that there is but one transcendent and mysterious divine reality, and all people of all times are confronted by the same challenge of the metaxy. To find truth we must turn to the metaxy—to the universal metaxy which is concomitant to human existence wherever it is found. What this does is make the second-order language of religious doctrine which is important for Lindbeck almost superfluous. Why bother with the superficialities of confessional discourse? If, down deep, we are driven by an authentic thirst for truth, i.e., the *zetema* which is really tied to the divine *helkein*, then we will simply follow the trail of the philosopher and bypass the confessionalism of any existing religious tradition. This is what Voegelin himself did. He belonged to no confessional tradition.

So it seems to me that if the confessional principle for Christianity is to hold, then we must presume or even demonstrate that it is grounded in ontological truth. We must be willing to assert that ultimate reality is properly understandable only if it is understood in terms of *sola gratia*, *sola scriptura*, and *solus Christus*. When I say this, of course, I am not advocating a simplistic return to literalistic propositionalism. I agree with Lindbeck that such a confessional statement is second-order discourse. Yet I am compelled to affirm that this symbolic articulation of an ancient pneumatic experience somehow ties us to that very revelatory experience. I believe that by applying meditative exegesis to the biblical symbols—and Christian doctrines should direct us to the biblical symbols—that the power of the originary experience

asks Voegelin, makes this impudent young scholar so cocksure that his personal and private relationship to God justifies such radical disobedience? To the modern world, Luther looks like a hero. To Voegelin, he is a symptom of our civilizational breakdown. Luther marks the appearance in the West of a new personality type, the radical revolutionary, loyal only to his conscience, who takes into himself the revelation of transcendent truth, establishes himself as the authority, and then acts accordingly. Once such a principle of individual conscience is let loose, it can result only in anarchy. And anarchy finally can be combated only by totalitarianism. This is just what has happened in the wake of the protestant Reformation. We can blame Luther's personality for the positivism, Marxism, and Nazism which followed.

That is enough on Luther's personality. Theologically, what Voegelin does not like is Luther's development of the doctrine of justification in opposition to Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of *fides caritate formata* (faith formed by love).³⁹ For Thomas, the essence of faith is found in the *amicitia*, the friendship between God and ourselves, a friendship which is based upon our intellectual apprehension of the beatific vision. For Thomas, this intellectual apprehension needed completion through our volitional adherence to a life of love; but, please note, the essential divine-human bond is formed first in the mind. This is what Voegelin applauds in Thomas and what he misses in Luther.

Luther's notion of *sola fide*, depicted as the "happy exchange" or the "mystical marriage of the soul with Christ," provides us with a justifying righteousness which belongs inherently Christ, not to us. It does not actually redeem human nature, and this bothers Voegelin. He objects loudly to Luther's advice to Melancthon to "sin boldly." The problem with the Lutheran understanding of justification is that it concerns the soul only without affecting the old Adam.

Voegelin admits that Luther argues passionately for a love which follows faith, but this is by no means confused with love understood as our *amicitia* with God. When Luther says that faith is for God and love is for the neighbor, Voegelin complains because this shifts the accent away from the *vita contemplativa* of medieval monasticism and toward the idea of human fulfillment through work and service. For Luther, our relationship with God is one of trusting faith; once that is settled, then we can turn our attention fully to loving our neighbors in this world. What could be more opprobrious to a mystical philosopher! The deadly results of Luther's influence are described by

Voegelin as the atrophy of intellectual and spiritual culture into the modern world devoted to utilitarian pragmatism and chiliastic ideologies.⁴⁰

This final criticism, I think, reveals Voegelin's true colors. He is a mystical philosopher and a humanist. What he cannot tolerate is that Luther can proceed to understand the healing of the human soul simply in terms of *solus Christus*, and he can do so while bypassing completely the centuries of striving by pagan philosophers and mystics who were driven by the *zetema*. What hurts Voegelin is that this approach overlooks the spiritual dimensions of the great works of culture, whether Christian or non-Christian culture. Augustine could appreciate pagan spirituality. Why was Luther unable to? Thus, finally, I think, it is Luther's lack of reverence for the pagans which bothers Voegelin. It is his lack of admission of Plato to the communion of saints which is the root problem.

In the face of Voegelin's objection I can only repeat what I suggested above, namely, that Luther is potentially a greater ally than Voegelin has perceived. With regard to Luther's reliance upon the individual conscience, this is in Voegelin's best interest. Voegelin himself describes the prophetic leap in being in ancient Israel as a reordering of the individual human soul over against society: "...in Jeremiah the human personality had broken the compactness of collective existence and recognized itself as the authoritative source of order in society."⁴¹ And of no less significance is the philosopher in Plato's *Gorgias* who, as an individual, will cease cooperating with the surrounding social injustice to die with a vision of transcendent justice. Therefore, if Voegelin were to remain true to his own convictions, he would see that it was Luther's very commitment to transcendent truth which enabled—even required—him to say, "Here I stand."

Where Do We Go Theologically?

It should appear obvious that the value of the work of a philosopher such as Voegelin is that it turns our attention toward the life-giving source of our religious symbols and their spiritual renewal in our time. He believed it is possible to reactivate the originary experiences which first gave birth to our religious language, but we can be successful only if we take precautions to prevent doctrinalization. We should not permit the engendering experiences with transcendent reality to become fixated in church dogma

Voegelin citing H. Richard Niebuhr's *The Meaning of Revelation*, in *New Science of Politics*, 78.

30. OH IV:228f.

31. In repudiating the alleged distinction between philosophical or "natural reason" with special or Christian "revelation," Voegelin writes: "Plato was just as conscious of the revelatory component in the truth of his *logos* as the prophets of Israel or the authors of the New Testament writings. The difference between prophecy, classic philosophy, and the Gospel must be sought in the degrees of differentiation of existential truth." "Gospel and Culture," 75. In an attempt to rescue Voegelin and put him into the orthodox Christian camp, Eugene Webb retrieves the categories of natural and special revelation, labels them "orthodox," and then tries to show how Voegelin simply affirms the continuity between the two. "Eric Voegelin's Theory of Revelation," *The Thomist* 42:1 (January 1978) 95-122. Webb seems to see less clearly than Morissey that Voegelin would be simply impatient with these objectifying scholastic distinctions, even when intended to be complimentary.

32. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 250; 1 Corinthians 13:12.

32. I am helped here in part by scholars who see revelation "in front" of the symbol, i.e., as illuminating mundane life. See Paul Ricoeur, "Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation" in *Essays on Biblical Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) and Ronald F. Thiemann, *Revelation and Theology* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1985).

34. Eric Voegelin, "The Beginning and the Beyond: A Meditation

on Truth," The Aquinas Lecture, Marquette University, 1975, unpublished. Cf. the discussion by Morissey, pp. 270ff.

35. Eric Voegelin, "Response to Professor Altizer's 'A New History and a New But Ancient God?'" *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* XLIII:4 (December 1975) 766; and "Quod Deus Dicitur," *Ibid.* LIII:4 (December 1985) 569-84.

36. Carl E. Braaten, "Prolegomena to Christian Dogmatics," *Christian Dogmatics*, ed. by Carl Braaten and Robert Jenson (2 vols.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) I:53f. Cf. also by Braaten, *Principles of Lutheran Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983) chapter two.

37. Elsewhere, apart from discussion of the confessional principle *per se*, Braaten is clear on the question of ontological truth. "The truth of the incarnation is that God is identified with this one man, communicating the divine Word through this man's particularity and the deepest love in the event of the cross." *Christian Dogmatics* I:541; cf. 560-68.

38. George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984) 80f.

39. Luther argues clearly that faith justifies without love in his "Commentary on Galatians of 1535." See *Luther's Works*, American Edition (St. Louis: Concordia, 1963) Vol. 26, pp. 126-137, esp. 136f.

40. Eric Voegelin, "The Great Confusion: Luther and Calvin," unpublished papers.

41. OH I:485; cf. 222f.